America's aircraft-safety regulator has been the industry's gold standard since it was set up in the 1950s.
自20世纪50年代成立以来，美国飞机安全监管机构一直是这行业的黄金标准。
When the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) called out an aeroplane as unsafe, counterparts around the world followed its lead.
当美国联邦航空管理局（FAA）宣布某一飞机不安全时，其全球同行也将照做。
That changed after a Boeing 737 Max jetliner crashed in Ethiopia on March 10th, killing all 157 on board,
但这一现象在两起空难后发生了变化。3月10日，一架波音737Max喷气客机在埃塞俄比亚坠机，机上157人全部遇难，
five months after the same model went down in Indonesia in apparently similar circumstances.
5个月后，在明显相似的情况下，同一机型飞机在印尼坠机。
The FAA grounded it only once all other big regulators around the world had done so.
但FAA在全球所有其他大型监管机构停飞该机型后才宣布停飞。
A week on, analysis of the black box recovered in Ethiopia suggests "clear similarities" with the Indonesian accident,
对埃塞俄比亚空难黑匣子的分析表明这起事故和印尼事故存在“明显相似性”，
the country's transport ministry said on March 17th. This raises questions about the FAA's certification of the plane.
该国交通部于3月17日表示。这就引发了有关FAA对该飞机进行认证的质疑。
On March 17th the Wall Street Journal reported that the Department of Justice had launched a probe into the MAX's development.
3月17日，《华尔街日报》报道称司法部已对MAX的开发进行调查。
Two days later the transportation secretary began an audit of the aeroplane's certification process.
两天后，交通部长开始了对该飞机认证过程的审查。
What went wrong? Jon Ostrower, an aviation writer, points to Boeing's decision in 2011 to put a new fuel-efficient engine on an earlier version of the popular 737.
什么地方出了问题？航空作家Jon Ostrower指出波音公司在2011年决定在热门737的早期型上安装一种新的节能引擎。
Airbus, its European arch-rival, was also planning to do the same on its competing narrow-body jet, the A320.
其欧洲劲敌空中客车公司也打算这么做—在其竞品窄体飞机A320上采取相同措施。
But although there was plenty of room under the A320 to fit these wider engines, the squatter 737 had less space.
但虽然A320飞机底部有足够的空间可以安装这些更宽的引擎，但是又宽又矮的737没有那么多的空间。
Boeing decided to mount the engine further forward instead, making the plane less aerodynamically stable.
波音决定将引擎放到更前端的地方，因此飞机在空气动力性上缺乏稳定性。
To improve stability, Boeing installed software called MCAS.
为了提高稳定性，波音安装了一款名为MCAS的软件。
This allowed pilots who were certified for the older 737 to fly the new version without getting a new licence.
这款软件能让驾驶老版737的飞行员无需取得新执照就能驾驶新机型.
Boeing did not mention MCAS in instruction manuals before the Indonesian crash, the Seattle Times reported.
《西雅图时报》报道称，在印尼坠机前，波音没有在操作工序说明书中提到MCAS。
Investigators think that MCAS may have contributed to that accident.
调查人员认为MCAS可能促成了那次事故。
Boeing continues to have "full confidence" in the 737 MAX's safety. While investigations continue, it says,
波音仍对737MAX的安全性充满信心。虽然调查还在继续，其表示，
"Boeing is finalising its development of a previously announced software update
“波音先前宣布的一款软件升级开发
and pilot training revision that will address the MCAS flight control law's behaviour in response to erroneous sensor inputs".
以及飞行员培训修订即将结束，这些将解决MCAS飞行控制律对错误感应器输入做出反应的行为”。

Boeing's team is in Ethiopia helping the investigators. The company says it is "devoted to the quality and safety of the aircraft we design, produce and support".
波音的团队正在埃塞俄比亚帮助调查。该公司表示将“致力于我们所设计、生产和支持的飞机的质量和安全性”。
Jim Hall, former chairman of America's National Transportation Safety Board, another regulator,
另一监管机构，美国国家运输安全委员会的前主席吉姆·霍尔
sees the root of the problem in the FAA's close relationship with Boeing.
认为问题的根源在于FAA和波音的亲密关系。
Since 2001 the company has lobbied vigorously to perform more of its own safety tests.
自2001年起，该公司积极游说要求更多的进行自家的安全测试。
In 2005 the FAA began to allow Boeing to do more self-certification. "It's like putting children in charge of the sweet shop," says a former Boeing adviser.
2005年，FAA开始允许波音进行更多的自我认证。“这就像是让孩子负责管理糖果店一样，”一名前波音顾问表示。
An investigation by the transportation department in 2012 found that the FAA had not done enough to "hold Boeing accountable".
2012年交通部的一项调查发现FAA在“让波音尽责方面”做得不够。
It quoted FAA employees who had reported retaliation for speaking up about problems with Boeing's previous designs.
其引用FAA员工的话，他们称自己因公开谈论波音之前设计中存在的问题而遭到报复。
Scott Brenner, a former associate administrator at the FAA, points out that safety inspectors at the FAA's office in Seattle,
FAA前副行政官斯科特·布伦纳指出，FAA西雅图办公室（这里也是波音主要生产设备所在地）的检察员
home to Boeing's main production facilities, may have worked closely with Boeing's own safety experts for decades.
可能在几十年来都和波音自家的安全专家有着亲密的合作。
A once-antagonistic relationship has grown chummier in recent years. Posters warning "don't talk to the FAA" are no longer a common sight.
在近些年中，曾今的敌对关系已经变得越来越亲密。“不要和FAA说话”的警告海报已经不再常见了。
It has not helped that President Donald Trump has left the top job at the FAA vacant since January 2018.
自2018年1月以来，唐纳德·特朗普总统就把FAA的局长一职空了出来，但这并没有起到帮助。
The acting administrator lacks all the powers of a permanent head, notes Mr Hall.
霍尔先生指出，代理管理者缺乏局长的所有权利。
Financial constraints encouraged the FAA to outsource certification to planemakers.
财政紧缩促使FAA将认证外包给飞机制造商。
Its budget increased by a sixth between 2002 and 2018, while American air traffic grew by 40%.
在2002年和2018年间，其预算增加六分之一，而美国空中交通增长了40%。
On March 19th Mr Trump named Stephen Dickson, a respected former senior executive at Delta Air Lines, to head the FAA.
3月19日，特朗普任命史蒂芬·迪克森这位备受尊敬的前达美航空公司高层出任FAA局长。
By then, other regulators' confidence in the FAA had been shot.
到那时，其他监管机构对FAA的信心已经大打折扣了。
The Ethiopian authorities have declined to give the black box to the FAA for data retrieval, sending it to France instead.
埃塞俄比亚当局已经拒绝将黑匣子交给FAA进行数据检索，而是将它交给了法国。
Those in Canada and Europe are re-examining decisions to approve the 737 Max based on mutual-recognition agreements with America.
加拿大和欧洲监管机构正在重新审查那些基于和美国的相互认可协议而批准的737 Max飞机。
Rather than trust the FAA, they may order their own tests before certifying future Boeing aircraft as airworthy.
他们或许宁愿在未来认证波音飞机的适飞性能前制定自己的检测也不愿再相信FAA了。

来源：经济学人