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The current era of trustbuster activism is based on a misapprehension.

当今时代的反垄断激进主义是基于一种误解。

In 1912 America’s Supreme Court ruled that a coalition of 14 railroad proprietors had used their joint ownership of a bridge across the Mississippi river, near the St Louis terminal, to unlawfully stifle competition.

1912年，美国最高法院裁定，一个由14名铁路业主组成的联盟利用他们对圣路易斯终点站附近一座横跨密西西比河大桥的共同拥有权，非法扼杀了竞争。

The crossing gave the railroad trust a chokehold over traffic to and from the city’s main terminal.

这条通道让这一铁路托拉斯扼住了往返圣路易斯市主要终点站的交通咽喉要道。

St Louis was an important railway hub.

而圣路易斯是一个重要的铁路枢纽。

In the court’s opinion, the monopoly power over the railway bridge was therefore a means to foreclose the business of rival rail operators across America.

因此，法院认为，对铁路桥的垄断是一种手段，用以阻止美国各地的竞争对手开展铁路运营业务。

More than a century later, American trustbusters are preparing for battle with another giant in a network industry.

一个多世纪后，美国的反托拉斯者正准备与网络行业的另一个巨头展开战斗。

In January the Department of Justice (DOJ) set out a 155-page complaint against Google for monopolising digital advertising on exchanges.

今年1月，美国司法部对谷歌提起了长达155页的申诉，认为其垄断了数字广告交易。

It alleges that Google used strong-arm tactics to lock up the ad-tech business.

司法部声称，谷歌使用了强硬策略来锁定广告技术业务。

The case is billed as the biggest antitrust challenge to tech since the DOJ’s epic battle with Microsoft in the late 1990s.

此案被标榜为自上世纪90年代末美国司法部与微软展开史诗般的斗争以来，科技行业面临的最大的反垄断挑战。

Central to the case is the acquisition by Google in 2008 of DoubleClick, which had developed a lead in the marketing of digital-advertising space.

此案的核心是谷歌在2008年收购了DoubleClick，后者在数字广告位的营销方面占据领先地位。

It has become almost an article of faith among regulators that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) should have blocked the merger.

联邦贸易委员会本该阻止这项合并，这几乎已经成为监管机构的一个信条。

As if to compensate for this laxity, trustbusters have recently sought to block many tech mergers, including Microsoft’s purchase of Activision Blizzard, a video-game maker.

似乎是为了弥补这种松懈，反托拉斯机构最近试图阻止许多科技公司并购，包括微软收购视频游戏开发商动视暴雪。

The DOJ is seeking to break up Google’s ad-tech business—in effect, undoing the DoubleClick merger.

美国司法部正在试图拆分谷歌的广告技术业务——实际上是将合并后的DoubleClick拆出去。

It is far from clear, however, that allowing this merger was actually a mistake.

然而，允许这一合并是否是一个错误，目前还远不清楚。

To understand why, start with a stylised view of Google’s ad-tech “stack”.

要了解其中原因，先以非写实的方式来看看谷歌的广告技术“堆栈”吧。

The middle layer is Google’s Ad Exchange, which matches buyers and sellers of advertising space (or “inventory”).

中间层是谷歌的广告交易平台，它为广告位(或“库存”)的买家和卖家牵线搭桥。

On one side of the market are website publishers who want to sell ad space.

市场的一方是想要出售广告位的网站出版商。

They submit sales requests via a digital tool.

他们通过数字工具提交售卖请求。

The antecedent of Google’s sell-side software is DoubleClick for Publishers, acquired in the merger.

谷歌卖方软件的前身是在合并中收购的DoubleClick for Publishers。

On the other side of the exchange are ad buyers, who have two routes to the market.

在交易平台的另一边是广告买家，他们有两条通往市场的途径。

Agencies and large ad buyers use demand-side platforms to bid for inventory.

代理商和大型广告买家使用需求方平台竞标库存。

Smaller advertisers go directly to Ad Exchange.

小型广告商则直接前往广告交易平台。

Google’s share of traffic varies between 40% and over 90%, depending on the stage of the journey.

在交易的不同阶段，谷歌的流量份额在40%到90%以上不等。

Bids and offers are matched by complex algorithms in the instant between a click on a website and a display ad appearing.

在点击网站和显示广告的瞬间，出价和提供的库存就通过复杂的算法进行了匹配。

In a case such as this, the best initial question is a straightforward one: where is the choke point?

在这种情况下，首先最该提出的问题是一个直截了当的问题：咽喉要道在哪里？

Microsoft was accused of tying Windows, the dominant operating system for desktop computers, to Internet Explorer in a manner that sought to exclude Netscape and others from the market for web browsers.

微软曾被指控将占主导地位的台式电脑操作系统Windows与IE浏览器进行捆绑，试图将网景等其他浏览器排除在网页浏览器市场之外。

Windows was the choke point, just as the bridge to St Louis was in the railroad case.

Windows系统就是咽喉要道，就像铁路案例中通往圣路易斯的大桥一样。

The charge against Google is more complex, or at least the story is one that is harder to tell.

对谷歌的指控则要复杂得多，或者说，至少这个故事更不容易讲清楚。

The locus of monopoly, in the DOJ’s telling, seems to shift.

根据美国司法部的说法，垄断的核心内容似乎正在发生变化。

First it lies with Google’s power on the demand side of digital advertising, through its adjacent strength in search ads.

最开始，垄断在于谷歌在数字广告需求侧的实力，因为它在搜索广告方面拥有邻近优势。

At other times, it is the company’s hold on the supply side, bolstered when it bought DoubleClick.

在其他时候，垄断关乎谷歌在供应侧的控制，这种控制在收购DoubleClick时得到了加强。

At still other times, the locus of market power is the exchange.

而在另一些时候，市场力量的中心又变成了交易平台。

This shape-shifting may simply be how foreclosure works in digital markets.

这种形态转变可能就是阻止数字市场竞争的运作方式。

The DOJ’s trustbusters are certainly eager to present Google’s end-to-end presence in the ad-tech stack as inherently sinister.

美国司法部的反托拉斯者当然急于将谷歌的这种供求两头抓的广告技术堆栈描述为本质上就是邪恶的。

But is it?

但事情果真如此吗？

The profitability of the ad-tech stack might reflect the fact it is more efficient under a single roof.

广告技术堆栈的盈利能力可能反映了这样一个事实，即在一个屋檐下效率更高。

The integration of publisher ad server, exchange and demand-side platforms is likely to make for a smoother flow of data, better matches between buyers and sellers and a more streamlined experience.

出版商广告服务器、交易和需求端平台的整合可能会使数据流动更顺畅，买家和卖家之间更好地匹配，体验更流畅高效。

And there are “network externalities” to consider.

此外，还有“网络外部性”需要考虑。

Ad tech brings together distinct groups (advertisers, publishers and consumers).

广告技术将不同的群体(广告商、出版商和消费者)聚集在一起。

Each sort of customer benefits the more custom there is from the other sorts: advertisers want access to a broad range of inventory; publishers want lots of bidders for their display space; and so on.

其他类型的群体来得越多，每种群体的受益就越大：广告商希望获得各种各样的库存，出版商希望有很多竞标者为他们的展示位出价，等等。

In similar kinds of networks, it is common for one enterprise to cater to all sides of the exchange.

在类似的网络中，一家企业迎合交易各方的需求是很常见的。

Think of payment systems, which have a business relationship with credit-card users as well as merchants.

想想支付系统，它与信用卡用户和商家都有业务关系。

Implicit in the DOJ case is the idea that the only route to a large part of the consumer market goes through Google.

美国司法部的谷歌案中隐含着这样一种想法，即进入很大一部分消费者市场的唯一途径是通过谷歌。

Trustbusters like to define markets narrowly.

反托拉斯者喜欢狭义地定义市场。

The smaller the market, the larger the leading firms loom in it.

市场越小，领军企业的规模就越大。

For their part, businesses like to claim that good substitutes for their products are everywhere: Netflix’s boss once claimed the firm’s main competitor was “sleep”.

对于企业来说，他们喜欢声称，他们产品的优秀替代品无处不在：网飞的老板曾声称该公司的主要竞争对手是“睡眠”。

It seems fair to say that “open-web display advertising sold via exchanges” is a distinct industry, because it has its own unique production technology.

公平地说，“通过交易平台销售的开放网络展示广告”是一个独特的行业，因为它有自己独特的生产技术。

It is less obvious that it is a market which is truly separate from digital advertising or plain old advertising.

不那么明显的是，这是一个与数字广告或传统广告真正分开的市场。

Nor is it obvious the FTC was lax in permitting the DoubleClick purchase.

联邦贸易委员会允许收购DoubleClick，这也并非显然就是一种松懈。

After all, the European Commission—no friend to American tech—allowed it after an in-depth investigation.

毕竟，欧盟委员会——这可绝非是美国科技公司的朋友——在经过深入调查后也允许了这种做法。

Perhaps, however, there was a better option available, says William Kovacic, an FTC commissioner at the time of the merger and now a law professor at George Washington University.

然而，威廉·科瓦奇表示，或许还有更好的选择。在进行合并时科瓦奇担任联邦贸易委员会委员，现为乔治华盛顿大学的法学教授。

Instead of suing in court to block the merger and (probably) losing, the agency could have pursued an internal-administrative trial.

与其通过在法庭上起诉来阻止合并，而且(可能)败诉，该机构本可以进行内部行政审判。

This would have afforded officials an opportunity to learn about tech and update their practices, says Mr Kovacic.

科瓦奇表示，这本可以让官员们有机会了解技术并更新他们的做法。

It might have allowed for remedies, short of unwinding the merger, to put Google on watch.

如果对谷歌进行观察，而不是取消合并，联邦贸易委员会可能会考虑到补救措施的。

The charge of “antitrust under-enforcement”, which has fuelled today’s over-active merger control, might not have taken hold.

“反垄断执法不力”的指控可能也就不会占上风，正是这种指控助长了如今过于激进的并购控制。

This is hardly water under the bridge.

很难说这些都是往事了。

An epic court battle is now in prospect.

现在，一场史诗般的法庭之战即将到来。

It may seem strange that this corner of the advertising business—almost a side-hustle for Google—will be the locus for it.

广告业务的这个角落——几乎是谷歌的一个副业——将成为战场，这可能看起来有些奇怪。

But antitrust cases often hinge on obscure details or arguments.

但反垄断案件往往取决于晦涩不清的细节或论据。

It is no stranger, after all, than a Supreme Court ruling that turned on the use of a railway terminal in St Louis.

毕竟，这比最高法院对圣路易斯铁路终点站做出的裁决也奇怪不到哪里去。

来源：经济学人